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WHAT CONSTITUTES JEOPARDY.
The decision in Kepner v. U. S., handed down by the Supreme
Court on the thirty-first of May, is noteworthy, not so much for
the ruling of the majority that-under the extension of the con-
stitutional guarantee to the Philippine Islands, there can be no
review by an appellate court of a verdict of acquittal in a crim-
inal cause-as for the strong dissenting opinion written'by Jus-
tice Holmes and concurred in by Justices White and McKenna.
This, after referring to the very prevalent idea that under our
present system, there is more danger of the escape of guilt
than of the punishment of innocence, maintains that too broad
a construction has been placed on the constitutional provisions
by which it is forbidden that any person shall be "twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb."
The majority of the courts have held that jeopardy com-
mences when a jury has been called and sworn. Com. v. AcCor-
mick, x49 Mass, 7; People v. Taylor, 117 Mich. 583. The inten-
tion is to prevent the state from bringing one trial to an incon-
clusive termination that it may institute another, to suit its own
convenience, but to the manifest disadvantage of the prisoners.
I Bish., New Crim. Law, § 1o9. Yet, without so broadly
interpreting this provision, the prisoner would seem to have
ample protection in the common law rule that he, or the court,
must consent to the entering of a nol. pros.; Com. v. Tuck, 20
Pick. 356; U. S. v. Shoemaker, 2 McLean (U. S.) 114; in the
passage of statutes to the same effect; Pep. & Lew., Dig. of the
Laws of Penn., r412, § 159; 3Ga. Code. 957; and in the unques-
tioned constitutional guarantees of the right to a speedy trial;
while the courts might be saved from countenancing the clear
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failure in logic consequent upon the impossibility of distin-
guishing this case from those in which a retrial is permitted
after a miscarriage of justice because of disagreement of the
jury, or mischance happening to the court, or similar cause.
Com. v. Purchase, 2 Pick, 521; People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467. The
better view, and that which has been supported by the English
courts and certain of those of the states, and has been favored
by the Federal judges, is that only a verdict can constitute
jeopardy. Reg. v. Charleswortk, 9 Cox. C. C., 44; People v.
Goodwin, I8 Johns. x87; U. S. v. Haskell, 4 Wash. (U. S.) 402;
U. S. v. Gilbert, 2 Lumn. (U. S.) i9.
And, as Justice Holmes argues, even a verdict ought not to
suffice, where resort is made to an appellate court for its
reversal. That it does, where the prosecution alleges the error,
is perhaps too firmly established by repeated decisions to admit
of change. U. S. v. Sanges, x44 U. S. 3o. That it does not,
where the prisoner sues out the writ, is equally clear. The
cases are distinguished on the ground either that by himself
seeking the reversal, the prisoner has waived his right of
exemption from another trial, People v. McKay, i8 Johns. 212;
or that the miscarriage of justice has prevented any such
jeopardy as the maxim regards. Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick. 502.
But, as to the former, Justice Holmes points out that it is very
doubtful whether the fundamental guarantees of the constitu-
tions can be waived. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343. And, for
the latter, it is difficult to perceive why an error resulting in a
failure of justice to the prisoner's advantage, does not equally
with one to his advantage, prevent the consummation of the
jeopardy. The true basis of the granting of a new trial would
seem to be that an appellate proceeding merely continues the
cause; Watrous v. Johnson, 24 How. 205; and that jeopardy is
not complete until a verdict is reached which finally concludes
the merits of the case. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265. The logical,
if impractical, conclusion, then, is that the state should have
the right to secure the reversal of an erroneous acquittal.
LEGISLATION AGAINST GREAT COMMERCIAL COMBINATIONS.
The report made at the last meeting of the American Bar
Association by the Committee on Commercial Law, dealing, as
it does, with the very timely topic of legislation to curb the
abuses arising from great aggregations of capital, has chal-
lenged the attention of the legal fraternity. Surely the posi-
tion taken by the committee is tbo radical. The picture which,
as an introduction, it draws of a "General Industrial Company,"
which is to embrace all the business of the country, selling all
products for what it wills, buying its labor as it chooses, far
transcends the bounds of possibility, for it disregards those
economic laws which require for labor a living wage, and which
decree that, as the inability to purchase an article increases, its
price decreases; those laws of human nature which limit the
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field that the executive brain of man can compass; those laws
of progress which are building up, over against the combina-
tions of capital, equally powerful combinations of labor. The
remedy which it advocates-doubtless, under the decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 36, legally possible-that
corporations engaged in interstate commerce shall be incor-
porated by the Federal authority, and that other, of doubtful
validity, that the Federal government, in order to maintain the
principle of competition, shall, in the last resort, itself become
a general producer, would be long strides in the growth towards
centralization of government which now seems to threaten our
political system. Nor would the assertion that the Sherman
Act has reached the limit of its usefulness commend itself to
the judges who dissented from the decision in the Northern
Securies Case, 193 U. S. 197. Yet in two respects the
report is worthy of close attention-on the one hand, for its
originality; on the other, for its wisdom. In the first place,
its proposition that gigantic combinations of wealth shall be
prevented by requiring a franchise fee which shall increase in
proportion to a greater capital; that in very truth the power to
tax shall involve the power to destroy, violates no constitutional
provision. Yet, after all, the danger threatens not so much
from great single organizations, as from the absorption and
combination of several corporations. Quite as efficacious, per-
haps, would be a stronger enforcement of the Sherman Act,
affecting, as it does, existing bodies as well as those of the
future, and a closer check upon the ability of one corporation
to obtain the shares of another. Secondly, the report does well
to emphasize, as least by implication, the principle that a
stronger light of publicity must be thrown upon the affairs of
these combinations. As this has influenced the more recent
legislation, so must it lie at the basis of all future reform.
32 Stat. atL., I. Ch. 552; 25 Stat. atL., Ch. 382.
THE GEORGIA CHAIN-GANG FOR PETTY OFFENSES.
The creators of our Federal Constitution would doubtless be
greatly surprised, and many of them deeply grieved, could they
arise and view the Fourteenth Amendment and its results.
They might feel, with some reason, that the fine balance they
established between central power and local freedom is being
rudely shaken and that the prospects of its restoration to an
even level are far from bright. And they would find that not a
few among the men of to-day look on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a source of serious national problems.
For better or for worse, we have entered on a new era of
our national existence, by attempting the "benevolent assimila-
tion" of races whose customs and conditions of life are radi-
cally at variance with our own. We have found that some of
our most beneficent institutions are for the present, at least,
unsuited to their use. For example, the jury system for crim-
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inal trials has met with but little success in Porto Rico. 8 Law
Notes, 302.
On the other hand, we have found it necessary to tolerate
evils in our dependencies, though the parallel evils in our own
lands have been abolished. Thus it is a matter of common
knowledge that among the Sulu Islanders we are permitting
domestic institutions which are tantamount to slavery. We
have found it impracticable to civilize those communities at
wholesale by immediate legislation. We have rather chosen to
let these new clans work out their own salvation with a consid-
erable degree of freedom.
In sharp contrast to the tolerance we are thus showing to
backward peoples beyond the sea, we have, as a nation, inter-
fered directly with several institutions of the South during the
past forty years. Yet it would be hard to show that our national
endeavors have brought the South appreciably nearer to a
solution of its vexing local problems. And so it is but natural
that a novel instance of Federal intervention, involving the
overthrow of a state law as unconstitutional, meets with a
divided public opinion.
The case in question is that of Jamison v. Wimbish, 13o Fed.
351, decided by Judge Emory Speer in the U. S. District Court
in the Western Division of the Southern District of Georgia.
The facts were as follows: The petitioner, a colored man, was
sentenced by a police judge to seven months of hard labor on a
local chain-gang for alleged drunkenness and disorderly conduct.
The chain-gang was employed on the public roads by a con-
tractor, under arrangements with the City of Macon and with
the commissioners of Bibb County. The petitioner sought
relief through habeas corpus from the Federal Court, averring
that his trial, sentence and commitment were illegal and void,
and that he was .thereby deprived of his liberty and subject to
infamous punishment without due process of law. Thus by
habeas corpus the police court sentence was submitted for review
to the distinguished author of the handbook on "Removal of
Causes from the State to Federal Courts."
After stating the facts, the Court shows that this chain-gang
sentence must be considered "infamous punishment" as defined
in Ex-parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 428, where Justice Gray says:
"For more than a century, imprisonment at hard labor in the
state prison or the penitentiary, or other similar institution, has
been considered an infamous punishment in England and
America." And since the chain-gang constituted infamous
punishment, the Court holds that "due process of law" would
necessarily include the right of appeal. "One man," says the
learned judge, "cannot adjudge infamy." And why could the
petitioner not have appealed to higher state courts? The Court
answers: "An appeal to the courts of the state would have
brought him no relief. . . . It seems that he might apply
for writ of certiorari to the judge of the superior courts. Acts
General Assembly, 3902, p. io5. Could he have given bond
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and paid the costs that judicial officer might in, his discretion
have superseded the judgment of conviction. But the local law-
maker, keenly appreciative of the value of a poor man's labor,
stipulates that in such appeals, if unable to pay costs or give
bond, the prisoner shall not be discharged. Then it is true,
that before his cause, with all its importance, could have been
heard, had the petitioner survived, the punishment would have
been suffered and the judgment on appeal would have been
worthless even had he prevailed." "The sentence against him
is void . . . for want of due process of law."
We must all agree that the court has here touched a vital
point. "Due process of law" is a phrase hard to define, but
this case seems a good precedent for a sound principle, that in
convictions involving infamous punishments, "due process of
law" requires a fair right of appeal-that "one man shall not
adjudge infamy."
But with this clear basis for the decision, we must look on
certain other portions of the decision as obiter dicta, and cannot
wholly agree with the principles which they seem to set forth.
It is well-established that the- first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution restrict only the national govern-
ment and not the states. Citing io Rose, Notes on U. S. Reps.
1074, the court seems to hold that "due process of law" in
prosecutions for infamous crimes by the states requires pre-
sentment or indictment by a grand jury, therein apparently
running counter to the Supreme Court decision in Hurtado v.
California. iio U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. Ii. In like manner the syl-
labus by the court holds trial by jury to be a right of the accused
in such cases-a statement which would seem to reverse the doc-
trine of Livingston v. Mfoore, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 55; Justices v. Murray,
76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 278; Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 557.
Of course the decision is not based on the first ten amendments,
directly, but these dicta seem to attain the same result by reading
the first ten amendments into the words "due process of law"
as used in the fourteenth. Possibly this is a logical necessity
from the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The poor policy of such Federal restraint on the action of
the states was clearly pointed out by Chief-Justice Marshall in
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 250. It seems unwise for
the national government to attempt any narrow regulation of
the judicial procedure of every local jurisdiction. So while we
can agree with the policy of defending the right of appeal in
cases of infamous crime, we trust that the dicta of this case may
not be followed to the extent of reversing Hurtado v. California,
supira.
DEPRIVING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS OF THE BENEFIT OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The familiar doctrine announced in The Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 13 Pet. 538, that a corporation is the creature of positive
law, and where that law ceases to operate can have no existence,
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was applied specifically to the exclusion of a foreign corporation
from the benefits of the Kansas Statute of Limitations by a
somewhat recent decision of the Supreme Court of that state.
Williams v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.., 74 Pac. 6oo. The statutory
language applicable to the case is as follows: "If when a cause
of action accrues against a person he be out of the state, the
period limited for the commencement of the action shall not
begin to run until he comes into the state." It was held that a
foreign corporation operating a street railroad within the state,
and having agents there upon whom service of process could be
made, was a person out of the state within the meaning of this
clause of the statute.
This question as to the right of a foreign corporation to take
advantage of the statute of limitations first arose in 1829 in the
case of U. S. Bank v. McKenzie, 2 Brock. (U. S. C. C.) 393, an
action brought in Virginia by The Bank of the United States, a
corporation existing under the laws of Pennsylvania, against
the indorser of a note discounted at its branch bank at Rich-
mond. The statute of limitations was pleaded against the bank
and it was held that the plaintiff did not come within the saving
clause of "beyond seas or out of the country," the residence of
the corporation being at Richmond and not at Philadelphia so
far as the clause applied to the locality of the plaintiffs.
Later, the question came up in New York in 1845. It was
held in Faulkner v. The Delaware and Raritan Canal Co., i Denio
441, that a foreign corporation could plead the statute of limita-
tions; that the cases excepted were against persons who had for
a time been out of the state, but had afterwards returned within
its limits; that the provision manifestly applied to natural
persons only and could not be made to embrace corporations.
This case was followed in 1857 in Olcott v. The Tioga R. R. Co.,
26 Barb. 147.
These cases were, however, overruled in Olcott v. The Tioga
R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 210, in 1859, and the rule has ever since
been settled in New York that a foreign corporation is within
the exception of the statute of limitations as to persons absent
from the state when a cause of action accrues against them. In
Nevada, under the provisions of a statute similar to that of New
York, it was held that a foreign corporation could not set up the
domestic statute of limitations as a defense to an action brought
in the domestic state either in real or personal actions. In an
action of ejectment brought against a foreign corporation, the
court ruled that under the statute a foreign corporation could not
obtain title to land in that state by adverse possession. Later the
New York rule was adopted in Wisconsin, and now by Kansas.
The majority of decisions maintain a rule which it is
believed is more consonant with justice. The rule, briefly
stated, is "that if, under the laws of the domestic state, the
corporation has placed itself in such a position that it may be
served with process, it may avail itself of the statute of limita-
tions when served." Wall v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 69 Ia. 498.
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Service of process is the test. The corporation must place
itself in such a position that at all time service of process may
be had upon its agents. A foreign corporation whose business
is such that it is not incumbent upon it to put itself in a posi-
tion to be at all times subject to the service of process, ought
not to be permitted to shield itself behind the statute of limita-
tions, because it may at some time or times (perhaps unknown
to one having a cause of action against it), have an agent in the
state upon whom process could be served. Winney v. Sandwich
Mfg. Co., 86 Ia. 6o8. There is no presumption that the cor-
poration has at all times been amenable to process so as to
enable it to take advantage of the domestic statute of limita-
tions. This is a fact to be shown by the corporation. Hubbard
v. United States Mortgage Co., i4 Ill. App. 40.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held the "residence "of a
corporation "to be where its business was done"; "where it
exercises its corporate franchises." Bristol v. The Chicago and
Aurora R. R.Co., 15 Ill. 436. Judge Dillon, in Stilwell v. The
Empire Fire Ins. Co., 4 Cent. Law Jour. 463, regarded the prop-
osition as reasonable and just, and said that if he were not
foreclosed by other decisions, referring doubtless to those of
Mr. Justice Nelson in Day v. Newark India Rubber Co., x Blatch.
628. and _Pomeroy v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. CO., 4 Blatch. xso, he
would be strongly inclined to hold that a corporation created
by the law of one state and doing business by permission in
another, although a citizen of the former, was an "inhabitant"
of the latter for purposes of jurisdiction. These views were
approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte
Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369. The justices held that the juris-
diction attaches upon the act of the party, and not by virtue of
the state law, which has no other effect than to authorize the
act; that the corporation is thereby found to be in the state, so
as to be amenable, like those of its own creation, to the process
of the courts established within it. They say that this was
really settled, and- Day v. Newark India Rubber Co., i Blatch. 628,
and Pomeroy v. N. Y. & . H. Co., 4 Batch. 120, overruled, by
Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, in which
decision Judge Nelson fully concurred. The decided weight of
authority is to the effect that in this class of cases the foreign
corporation is resident where by proper permission it carries
on its business. New York, in its Code of Civil Procedure, has
provided for personal service by summons on foreign corpora-
tions by delivering a copy to a person designated for that pur-
pose. Such designation must specify a place within the state
as the office and residence of the person designated, and the
designation remains in force until the filing of a written revoca-
tion. While this designation remains in force, the corporation
can claim the benefit of the statute of limitations. It is appar-
e~nt that this course will in time be followed by those states
whichr have followed the rule originally laid down in New York,
depriving foreign corporations of the right to plead the statute
of limitations. Norris v. Atlas S. S. Co., 37 Fed. 426.
